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Introduction
On March 24, 1979, Jocelyn Vargas was shot outside the Alham-
bra Theatre on Polk Street in San Francisco after attending a showing
of the movie Boulevard Nights.' On March 23, 1980, William Aim was
injured in his home when a tool he was making shattered.2 On Octo-
ber 26, 1984, John Daniel McCollum shot himself to death after listen-
ing to Ozzy Osbourne's song Suicide Solution.3 In January 1988
Wilhelm Winter and Cynthia Zheng consumed poisonous mushrooms,
became critically ill, and later required liver transplants.4
The common thread joining this seemingly disparate list of per-
sonal injuries or tragedies is the attempt, unsuccessful in each circum-
stance, to blame the injuries, or death, on words or pictures. In each
case the defendants incurred substantial legal fees in their defense,
fees not recoverable from the plaintiffs. Each defendant learned by
experience the true cost of free expression, and unless the rules of the
game are changed, many others will learn that same expensive lesson.
I
Personal Injury Claims Brought Against Those Who
Exercise Rights of Free Expression
A. Claims of Physical Injury
Jocelyn Vargas asserted that the makers of the film Boulevard
Nights
knew, or should have known, that said movie was a violent movie
and would attract certain members of the public to view said movie
who were prone to violence and who carried weapons . . . [and]
would, or were likely to cause grave bodily injury upon other mem-
bers of the general public at or near the showing of said movie
and that they "negligently failed to warn" Vargas of these facts.5
Claiming negligence and negligent misrepresentation, William Alm
sued the publisher and author of a book entitled The Making of
Tools.6 The parents of John Daniel McCollum, a nineteen year-old
with serious emotional problems and a history of alcohol abuse, sued
multiple defendants involved in the recording and distribution of Ozzy
Osbourne's music under theories of negligence, product liability, and
1. Bill v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625, 626 (Ct. App. 1982).
2. Aim v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1264 (I11. Ct. App. 1985).
3. McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 189-90 (Ct. App. 1985).
4. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991).
5. Bill, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
6. Aim, 480 N.E.2d at 1264, 1266.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 17:571
REDUCING THE COST OF FREE EXPRESSION
intentional misconduct.7 Wilhelm Winter and Cynthia Zheng sued the
publishers of The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms under theories of prod-
uct liability, breach of warranty, negligence, negligent misrepresenta-
tion, and false representations, alleging that the book contained
erroneous information about a deadly mushroom that led them to be-
lieve the variety was, in fact, one of the edible types.8
B. Claims of Emotional Injury
In two very recent unreported cases, efforts were made to impose
substantial economic liability on authors because their words allegedly
caused not physical injuries but emotional damage to readers and
their family members.9 On April 27, 1994, plaintiffs Kimberly Mark
and her husband William Mark filed a complaint in the Superior
Court of the State of California for the County of San Luis Obispo
against a number of therapists, two organizations, and Laura Davis,
author of The Courage to Heal Workbook.' ° That book, authored and
published in 1990, was intended to complement a book published two
years earlier by Laura Davis and Ellen Bass entitled The Courage to
Heal." Both books were designed to assist those who were, or might
have been, victims of childhood sexual abuse to recognize and over-
come the emotional toll of such abuse. The books posit the belief that
the human mind is capable of repressing memories of seriously trau-
matic events and offer guidance and counseling to those who believe
they perhaps were victims of childhood sexual abuse, but who have
either no memories or incomplete memories of specific events.
In addition to suing the defendant therapists for medical malprac-
tice and negligence, Kimberly Mark also sued author Laura Davis for
misrepresentation and negligence.' 2 Mark alleged that The Courage
to Heal Workbook was filled with factual misstatements which "taught
and/or induced" her to believe that certain memories she had of child-
hood sexual abuse were real, when in fact they were false. 3 Mark
alleged that both her therapy and the book caused her substantial
7. McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
8. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1034.
9. See David v. Jackson, No. 540624 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento County filed June
22, 1994); Mark v. Davis, No. 075386 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Luis Obispo County filed Apr.
27, 1994).
10. Mark v. Davis, No. 075386 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Luis Obispo County filed Apr. 27,
1994).
11. ELLEN BASS & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL (1st ed. 1988); LAURA
DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL WORKBOOK (1990).
12. Mark v. Davis, No. 075386 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Luis Obispo County filed Apr. 27,
1994).
13. Id.
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emotional distress and seriously damaged her relationship with her
family by leading her to falsely accuse her father of molestation.14
Her husband sued for loss of consortium. 15
Shortly thereafter, Deborah David, her husband, children, and
parents filed suit in the Superior Court of the State of California for
the County of Sacramento against a number of therapists, an organi-
zation, and both Laura Davis and Ellen Bass. 6 In her First Amended
Complaint filed on June 22, 1994, David brought claims against the
authors for medical malpractice, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negli-
gent referral and supervision, loss of consortium/affection, breach of
fiduciary duty, false advertising, fraud and misrepresentation, public
nuisance, breach of contract, and breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.' 7 She asserted that her therapists and both
books convinced her that memories of childhood sexual abuse were
real, when in fact they were false.' 8 Just as Kimberly Mark had al-
leged, David alleged that she confronted her father, accused him of
molesting her as a child, and thereby devastated her family and inter-
fered with her relationship with her parents and their relationship
with her children.' 9
C. Logical Justification for Injury Claims Flowing from Free Expression
It cannot be disputed that Jocelyn Vargas, William Alm, John Mc-
Collum, Wilhelm Winter, and Cynthia Zheng each suffered a discern-
able and identifiable physical injury, or that the resulting suits each
alleged a credible nexus between a work of creativity and a physical
injury. If a book represented as an authoritative source on the selec-
tion and consumption of mushrooms misidentified a mushroom as
safe and edible when it was in fact deadly, or if a book describing the
proper method of making tools erred in its instructions such that one
who carefully followed those instructions suffered personal injury, to
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. David v. Jackson, No. 540624 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento County filed June 22,
1994).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id.; Mark v. Davis, No. 075386 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Luis Obispo County filed
Apr. 27, 1994). In the cases filed by Deborah David and Kimberly Mark, the respective
courts sustained demurrers without leave to amend and entered judgments of dismissal.
See Mark v. Davis, No. 075386 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Luis Obispo County Oct. 7, 1994)
(order sustaining demurrers of defendant and judgment of dismissal); David v. Jackson,
No. 540624 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento County Sept. 8, 1994) (order sustaining demurrers
of defendants and judgment of dismissal).
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impose liability for such errors does not offend logic or reason. After
all, the accuracy or inaccuracy of the factual statements made in those
volumes can be proven, as can a causal link between any factual error
and the resulting physical injury. Similarly, when a rock star in his
song counsels young listeners to commit suicide, and one does, or
when movie producers have reason to know because of earlier inci-
dents that a particular movie invites a violent reaction, but fail to take
steps to protect or warn patrons, there may be a reasonable and logi-
cal argument that would support the imposition of monetary liability.
In contrast, the emotional injuries assertedly suffered by
Kimberly Mark, Deborah David, and their respective families are
somewhat less demonstrable than the physical injuries of Jocelyn Var-
gas, William Alm, John McCollum, Wilhelm Winter, or Cynthia
Zheng, and the mechanism of injury is less clear. The fundamental
logic, however, that suggests the possibility of imposition of liability
against a book author for physical injury would support the imposition
of like liability for emotional injury. The books at issue are aimed at a
market of emotionally vulnerable readers, and by their terms direct
such readers through the process of determining whether or not they
were victims of sexual abuse as children, and guide them along the
road to recovery in the event they were. It is certainly foreseeable
that many who would read either or both books are characterized
most sharply by their emotional fragility, and likely would be influ-
enced by those who have expertise in the area of emotional healing.
Consequently, it is foreseeable that some readers would be convinced
erroneously by the books' teachings that they were victims of particu-
lar conduct at the hands of their parents, that they would then con-
front their parents, and by so doing would damage their family
relationships. Given the foreseeability of such harm occurring to
some small percentage of the readers of the books, one can argue that
the authors of such books should be liable in such circumstances. The
law, however, is properly to the contrary.
19951
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II
Both the First Amendment and the Common Law
Bar Such Lawsuits
A. Established Law Prohibits Claims of Injury Based on the Exercise of
Rights of Free Speech
The First Amendment clearly applies to the publication and dis-
tribution of books,20 and the rights it grants are accorded a preferred
place in our democratic society.2 Above all else, the First Amend-
ment "means that government has no power to restrict expression be-
cause of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content,"
whether by injunction or by economic penalty.2
As the Court noted in Smith v. California, the free publication
and dissemination of books and other forms of printed words are
within constitutionally protected freedoms of liberty of press and
speech;23 it is immaterial that dissemination takes place under com-
mercial auspices. 21 "[T]he central concern of the First Amend-
ment ...is that there be a free flow from creator to audience of
whatever message a film or a book might convey .... [T]he central
First Amendment concern remains the need to maintain free access of
the public to the expression. '"25
Subject to certain limited exceptions, 26 authors, publishers, musi-
cians, and movie producers owe no duty to the general public for inju-
ries allegedly resulting from the content of their respective works.27
Courts in California 28 and elsewhere 29 have relied on a combination
of the First Amendment, traditional common law principles, and pub-
20. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,64 (1963); Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 149-50 (1959), reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 950 (1960); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444, 452 (1938). "First Amendment guarantees of freedom of expression extend to all
artistic and literary expression, whether in music, concerts, plays, pictures or books." Mc-
Collum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal Rptr. 187, 192 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing Schad v. Borough of
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981)).
21. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945), reh'g denied, 323 U.S. 819 (1945).
22. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See also New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23. 361 U.S. at 149-50, reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 950 (1960).
24. Id. at 150.
25. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 77 (1976) (Powell, J., concur-
ring), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976).
26. See, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 192-93 (Ct. App. 1988); Olivia
N. v. NBC, 141 Cal. Rptr. 511, 513-14 (Ct. App. 1977) [hereinafter Olivia 1], cert. denied,
NBC v. Niemi, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
27. See, e.g., Olivia N. v. NBC, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Ct. App. 1981) [hereinafter OliviatI'.
28. See, e.g., McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988); Bill v. Supe-
rior Court, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (Ct. App. 1982).
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lic policy considerations in determining that these artists owe no duty
to plaintiffs allegedly harmed by their publications. The overriding
themes common to these decisions are the courts' recognition of the
chilling effect upon free expression that such liability would create and
a universal unwillingness to so chill free expression.
In Olivia N. v. NBC, the plaintiff, who was attacked and "artifi-
cially raped" with a bottle, sued a television network and its San Fran-
cisco affiliate claiming that the assailants had been incited to their
action because they had seen a similar attack the previous evening in a
television film.30 The trial court dismissed the case after plaintiff's
counsel indicated in opening statement that the plaintiff would not
attempt to prove that the television movie was intended to incite the
"artificial rape."'" The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the
movie was constitutionally protected and that plaintiffs could not es-
tablish tort liability absent a showing of intended incitement:
Appellant does not seek to impose a prior restraint on speech;
rather, she asserts civil liability premised on traditional negligence
concepts. But the chilling effect of permitting negligence actions for
a television broadcast is obvious. "The fear of damage awards...
may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under
a criminal statute." Realistically, television networks would become
significantly more inhibited in the selection of controversial materi-
als if liability were to be imposed on a simple negligence theory ....
The deterrent effect of subjecting the television networks to negli-
gence liability because of their programming choices would lead to
self-censorship which would dampen the vigor and limit the variety
of public debate.3 2
The protections granted by the First Amendment may yield in the face
of intended incitement of lawless conduct, but not in the face of al-
leged negligence.
In Bill v. Superior Court33 a California Court of Appeal rejected
on First Amendment grounds the plaintiff's attempt to impose liability
based upon the content of a movie:
Film producers considering a movie about gangs, or about violence,
or bearing some resemblance to a movie which attracted violence-
prone persons, would be required to take into account the potential
for liability to patrons for acts of violence on the part of persons
over whom the producers would have no control. If, under such
29. See, e.g., DeMuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990 (E.D.N.Y. 1977);
Roman v. City of New York, 442 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1988); Aim v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co.,
480 N.E.2d 1263 (Ill. Ct  App. 1985).
30. Olivia H, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91.
31. Id. at 891.
32. Id. at 892 (citations omitted) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 277 (1964)).
33. 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (Ct. App. 1982).
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circumstances, they were held to have a duty to warn potential pa-
trons of the risk of attending their movie, they would have to antici-
pate that the warning would deter substantial portions of the public
from attending it .... And if, under such circumstances, they were
held to be responsible for providing security protection at and in the
vicinity of every theater at which the movie is shown, including pub-
lic streets, the attendant costs might be substantial indeed. It is thus
predictable that the exposure to liability in such situations would
have a chilling effect upon the selection of subject matter for movies
similar to the effect which concerned the court in Olivia N.34
The court also discussed plaintiff's claims under established principles
of common law and held that the defendants did not owe any duty to
the plaintiff, even independent of First Amendment concerns.
In McCollum v. CBS, Inc.36 a California Court of Appeal relied
on both constitutional and common law principles to dispose of an
action seeking to impose liability for exercise of First Amendment
freedoms. The court held that the plaintiffs' pleading failed to allege
any basis for overcoming the bar of the First Amendment's guarantee
of free speech and expression, and affirmed the order of dismissal fol-
lowing the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend.37
The court also concluded as a matter of law that the defendants
owed no duty to the plaintiffs and that the decedent's suicide was not
a reasonably foreseeable risk or consequence of the defendants' artis-
tic expression.38 In concluding its duty analysis, the court stated,
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, it is simply not acceptable to
a free and democratic society to impose a duty upon performing
artists to limit and restrict their creativity in order to avoid the dis-
semination of ideas in artistic speech which may adversely affect
emotionally troubled individuals. Such a burden would quickly
have the effect of reducing and limiting artistic expression to only
the broadest standard of taste and acceptance and the lowest level
of offense, provocation and controversy. No case has ever gone so
far. We find no basis in law or public policy for doing so here.
39
Finally, the court held that because there were no allegations that the
defendants intended to cause the decedent's suicide, the plaintiffs' in-
tentional tort theories must also fail.n°
34. Id. at 628-29.
35. Id. at 630-34.
36. 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1988).
37. Id. at 191-98. The court disposed of the case on First Amendment grounds, hold-
ing that because the recorded lyrics did not constitute an incitement to commit suicide, the
lyrics were a form of protected expression. Id. at 196. To hold otherwise "would lead to a
self-censorship which would dampen the vigor and limit the variety of artistic expression."
Id. at 195.
38. Id. 196-97.
39. Id. at 197 (footnote omitted).
40. Id. at 197-98.
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In Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, the court relied on both First
Amendment principles and traditional tort analysis.4 ' "Guided by the
First Amendment and the values embodied therein," the court de-
clined to extend liability under any of the plaintiffs' articulated theo-
ries "to the ideas and expression contained in a book."42 The court
continued,
We conclude that the defendants have no duty to investigate the
accuracy of the contents of the books it publishes. A publisher may
of course assume such a burden, but there is nothing inherent in the
role of publisher or the surrounding legal doctrines to suggest that
such a duty should be imposed on publishers. Indeed the cases uni-
formly refuse to impose such a duty. Were we tempted to create
this duty, the gentle tug of the First Amendment and the values
embodied therein would remind us of the social costs. 43
Because the plaintiffs did not pursue the authors of The Encyclopedia
of Mushrooms, the court was not compelled to consider the question
of author liability."4
Other courts have reached the same conclusion. For example, in
DeMuth Development Corp. v. Merck & Co. the plaintiff, a chemical
manufacturer, sued Merck, the publisher of a drug and chemical ency-
clopedia, for the negligent and willful misrepresentation of the toxicity
of a chemical manufactured by the plaintiff, which allegedly caused a
loss of the plaintiff's business and customers.4 5 The court granted
Merck's motion for summary judgment, holding that the publisher
owed no legal duty to the plaintiff.46 The fact that the defendant pub-
lished the encyclopedia for a serious purpose and expected its readers
to rely upon it as an authoritative source did not create a basis for
liability:
Nor does plaintiff point to any "relationship of the parties, arising
out of contract or otherwise," which "in morals or good conscience"
placed Merck under any duty towards plaintiff or its business. On
the contrary, Merck's right to publish free of fear of liability is guar-
anteed by the First Amendment, and the overriding societal interest
in the untrammeled dissemination of knowledge. The right is cir-
cumscribed only by laws such as those respecting national secrets,
copyright, obscenity, defamation and unfair competition. The court
has already held that no claim for defamation is stated and plaintiff
does not rely on any grounds other than negligence and willful
misrepresentation.47
41. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
42. Id. at 1036.
43. Id. at 1037.
44. Id. at 1034.
45. 432 F. Supp. 990, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)).
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Despite an alleged factual misrepresentation, the court refused to im-
pose a duty upon Merck.48 To do so would create "the spectre of un-
limited liability, with claims devastating in number and amount
crushing the defendant because of a momentary lapse from proper
care."
49
In the case of Roman v. City of New York, a New York Supreme
Court found that authors and publishers of written materials owe no
duty to prospective readers. 50 The Roman court, relying on common-
law principles, held that defendant Planned Parenthood was not liable
to the plaintiff for an alleged misstatement contained in a booklet it
published.5 The plaintiff obtained the booklet at issue after attending
a lecture on sterilization and allegedly relied upon statements therein
that pregnancy was not possible and contraceptives were not neces-
sary following a tubal ligation.52 The plaintiff later received a tubal
ligation, did not use contraception, and subsequently became
pregnant. 53
The court's discussion focused largely on its conclusion that
Planned Parenthood did not owe a duty to the plaintiff for an alleged
negligent misstatement contained in the booklet.54 After determining
that a defendant is bound only where some relational duty arises,
either by contract, public calling, or otherwise, the court stated,
This court need not decide whether a relational duty would have
existed if plaintiff Carmen Roman had sought out Planned
Parenthood's advice. She did not. The evidence is clear and over-
whelming that plaintiff sought the advice of friends and relatives
and relied on the knowledge of the physicians and staff at Queens
General Hospital. She did not go to defendant and defendant did
not contact her. Their sole relationship is her fortuitous receipt of
defendant's booklet at the hospital. That defendant pointedly in-
tended the booklet to provide information to the general public, in-
cluding plaintiff, and the fact that it could have reasonably foreseen
plaintiff's reliance thereon, does not change the result. One who
publishes a text cannot be said to assume liability for all "misstate-
ments", said or unsaid, to a potentially unlimited public for a poten-
tially unlimited period.55
48. Id. at 993-95.
49. Id. at 993-94 (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 708 (4th ed. 1971)).
50. 442 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1981).
51. Id. at 947-48.
52. Id. at 946.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 947. The court very quickly disposed of the plaintiff's claim that the state-
ments in the booklet constituted actual fraud, as there was no evidence to support a con-
clusion that such statements constituted a knowing or intentional misrepresentation. Id.
55. Id. at 947-48 (citations omitted). In Aim v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co. the court
refused to impose negligence liability upon the publisher. 480 N.E.2d 1263 (II1. Ct. App.
1985). The court cited language identical to that cited by the court in Roman and held that
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Deborah David's sole relationship with Laura Davis and Ellen
Bass was the fortuitous purchase of the books The Courage To Heal
Workbook and The Courage To Heal. William Alm's sole relationship
with Van Nostrand Reinhold Company was the fortuitous purchase of
a book about the making of tools. John Daniel McCollum's sole rela-
tionship with Ozzy Osbourne was the fortuitous purchase of a phono-
graph record. The fact that Laura Davis and Ellen Bass as well as Van
Nostrand Reinhold Company intended their books to provide infor-
mation and guidance to the general public does not give rise to a duty
to every member of the public who reads those books. The fact that
Ozzy Osbourne knew of his influence with teenagers likewise does not
give rise to a duty to every member of that group who listens to his
songs. To hold otherwise would create unlimited liability, to anyone,
forever.
B. Policy Considerations Militate Against Such Claims
It is perhaps a hallmark of our time that so many members of the
public believe that anything bad that happens to them should be
blamed on someone else, and that anything they do not like or with
which they do not agree should be suppressed. The First Amendment
to the United States Constitution was adopted more than two centu-
ries ago precisely to prevent such censorship, whether by governmen-
tal injunction or by the visitation of economic destruction on those
who would speak or write.
Claimants such as those described here simply do not possess
cognizable claims against book authors or publishers, songwriters, or
other artists whose only alleged wrong was their exercise of their con-
stitutionally protected right to express their views, philosophies, and
beliefs, in word or image. Recognition of such claims, no matter how
logical or compelling they may seem in a particular factual context,
can only deter or chill the willingness of people to speak, write, or
to impose a duty on those in the publishing business "would open the doors 'to a liability in
an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."' Id. at 1266
(quoting Yuhas v. Mudge, 322 A.2d 824, 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974)). The court
refused to create such a severe burden on the defendant. Id. at 1265. In addition to reli-
ance on common law principles, the court also based its decision on First Amendment
principles and recognized that any action which limits free expression must be scrutinized
for potential infringement of the public right of free access to ideas as well as the rights of
publishers to freely disseminate ideas. Id. at 1267 (citing CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)). The court dismissed the plaintiff's attempt to distinguish a
"how to" book from books on philosophy, politics, religion, and the like, instead recogniz-
ing the chilling effect liability would engender. Aim, 480 N.E.2d at 1267. "Even if liability
could be imposed consistently with the Constitution, we believe that the adverse effect of
such liability upon the public's free access to ideas would be too high a price to pay." Id.
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otherwise express their views by creating the prospect of unlimited
liability to all persons who now occupy, or who may at any time in the
future occupy, this planet. Such broad liability, and the resultant chill
on freedom of expression, will not make the world a safer place, only
a more barren one.
III
The Problem
Favorable as the existing protection may seem for authors, lyri-
cists, artists, or other disseminators of words or images, protection
must be made more favorable. Absent a method of shifting the cost
of successful defense of claims of physical or emotional injury against
those who would speak, write, or otherwise disseminate their
thoughts, ideas, and views, such lawsuits will continue to be filed. The
mere assertion of such claims, even when successfully defended, cre-
ates a clear and definable risk of chilling the dissemination of con-
cepts, ideas, and thoughts. At present, the creator-defendant must
face the sometimes staggering cost of his or her defense, With no pros-
pect of recovering that cost when the defense is successful. Those who
experience that reality, or see others experience it, frequently react by
withholding further expression of thoughts and ideas.
IV
An Avenue to a Solution
The problem faced by those who would express their views or
thoughts in the fashions described above-having to expend substan-
tial, non-recoverable funds simply to vindicate their clear and uncon-
trovertible rights-is not unique to such communicators. Others with
equal rights of free expression, but who utilize those rights in other
contexts, have faced over the years and still face in many jurisdictions
precisely the same problem.
Those who speak on public issues, whether political, social, or
otherwise, are vulnerable to the same costly suits, and "enjoy" with
the same frequency the vindication of their rights at the same exces-
sive level of expense as the authors, artists, and others described ear-
lier. In recent years, for example, citizens who speak out against real
estate developments, or against political candidates, ballot proposi-
tions, or civic changes, have felt the lash of those who sue to silence
and intimidate. Like the authors, publishers, movie producers, and
[Vol. 17:571HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
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songwriters in the foregoing cases, those victims of SLAPP56 suits pre-
vail against such attacks on their freedom of expression, but only at
substantial economic cost.
For some victims of SLAPP suits, however, the cavalry is on the
way. Some states have recently enacted legislation designed to pro-
tect such victims, or at least to shift the costs and fees incurred by
them to those responsible for such suits.
In California, for example, the legislature enacted Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16 in 1992.57 Section 425.16 is designed to pro-
vide a mechanism for early challenge to such suits and for fee shifting
where appropriate. Under that statute, a person sued for exercising
his or her right of speech or press in connection with a public issue
may file at the outset of the litigation a special motion to strike. The
court must then make a determination as to whether or not the plain-
tiff has established a probability that he or she will prevail on the
claim, and, if not, the court shall both grant the motion to strike and
award the defendant his or her attorney fees in bringing that
challenge.
Expansion of that statute, and comparable ones, to cover claims
made against authors, songwriters, or others exercising their protected
right to convey words, images, ideas, and philosophies may be the
only method by which such communicators can protect themselves
from the sometimes devastating cost of defending their right to free
expression. After all, free expression is free expression, whether it is
political, informational, or artistic. However, it is hardly "free" if one
must spend substantial funds simply to vindicate the right to exercise
it. Consequently, there is no reason in law or logic why the mecha-
nism provided in anti-SLAPP legislation could not, and should not, be
made available to all who exercise their rights of expression in any
context.
V
A Legislative Proposal
Borrowing heavily from California's Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 425.16, the so-called anti-SLAPP legislation, the legislature could
readily craft procedural protections that apply to all who would ex-
press themselves, whether politically, socially, artistically, or other-
56. SLAPP is becoming recognized as a handy acronym for Strategic Lawsuits to
Avoid Public Participation.
57. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 726.
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wise, and in any medium of expression. The following proposal, for
example, would accomplish precisely such an end:
MOTION TO STRIKE CHALLENGE TO
EXERCISE OF RIGHT OF FREE EXPRESSION
(a) A cause of action against a person arising from any act of
that person in furtherance of the person's right of free speech or
free expression under the United States or California Constitution
shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court deter-
mines that the plaintiff has established a probability that the plain-
tiff will prevail on the claim. In making its determination, the court
shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits
stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based;
(b) If the court determines that the plaintiff has established a
probability that he or she will prevail on the claim, neither that de-
termination nor the fact of that determination shall be admissible in
evidence at any later stage of the case, and no burden of proof or
degree of proof otherwise applicable shall be affected by that
determination;
(c) In any action subject to subdivision (a), a prevailing defend-
ant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or
her attorney fees and costs. If the court finds that a special motion
to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary de-
lay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney fees to a
plaintiff prevailing on the motion, pursuant to § 128.5,
(d) This section shall not apply to any enforcement action
brought in the name of the people of the State of California by the
Attorney General, a district attorney, or city attorney, acting as a
public prosecutor;
(e) As used in this section, "act in furtherance of a person's
right of free speech or free expression under the United States or
California Constitution" includes any written, oral, pictorial, or
graphic presentation or representation of any opinion, philosophy,
thought, idea, perspective, or characterization, and shall be inter-
preted broadly to accomplish the purpose of this statute.
Such a rule balances the legitimate interests of plaintiffs who have
meritorious claims not barred by clear authority and communicators
who should not be forced to foot the bill to defeat non-meritorious
claims barred by such clear authority. Subdivision (a) allows a de-
fendant to mount an early challenge to a case attacking his or her
exercise of the right of free expression and to shift the economic bur-
den of that challenge if successful, while subdivision (c) discourages
frivolous challenges by shifting the costs thereof.
58. California Code of Civil Procedure § 128.5 authorizes the shifting of costs and at-
torney fees to a party, the party's counsel, or both for "bad-faith actions or tactics that are
frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5
(West Supp. 1995).
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Conclusion
A single unsupportable claim against a protected dissemination
of words, images, or thoughts inflicts economic damage and chills ex-
pression. Several such claims, even if defeated, inflict economic dev-
astation and ultimately cause silence, actual or metaphorical. Unless,
and until, a means is provided, whether as recommended here or
otherwise, for the victim of a legally baseless or hopeless challenge to
his or her exercise of protected expression to recover the cost of his or
her vindication, free expression will simply cost too much, and we will
all be that much poorer.

